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Abstract
The standard two-country monopolistic competition model of interna-
tional trade by Helpman and Krugman based on S-D-S preferences is ex-
tended to allow for costly search between producers of varieties and retail-
ers. This extension endogenously divides ﬁrms to closed (domestic produc-
ers matched with domestic retailers) and open sectors. Trade policies have
an eﬀect on this division. Trade policies have also an eﬀect on the long
term gross ﬁrm and job creation and destruction. In a symmetric equilib-
rium an increase in tariﬀ (by both countries) increases the gross ﬂow of
ﬁrms in all sectors while gross job ﬂows increase in the closed sector and
decrease in the open sector. The welfare of eﬀects of tariﬀs are surpris-
ing. Tariﬀs can improve welfare if they switch enough resources from the
producers searching a partner from producers already matched. This is a
novel result not to be found in the literature before. Another novel result is
that in the model the non-equivalence of tariﬀs and quotas is highlighted.
The consequences of diﬀerences in factor endowments are also studied. In
the necessarily asymmetric equilibrium the small country has a lower wage
r a t et h a nt h el a r g ec o u n t r y .I t sp r o d u c t i o no fe a c ho fi t se x p o r t e dv a r i e t y
is larger than the production of exported varieties in the large country.
(previous version April 14, 2000)
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1. Introduction
This paper builds a model of international trade and monopolistic
competition with costly search between producers and retailers of va-
rieties of goods. The aim of the paper is to show that accounting for
∗This work is part of the project ”Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, Produc-
tivity, and Labour Markets” ﬁnanced by the Academy of Finland. I thank Marcel
Janssen, Klaus Kultti, Matti Liski and Juha Virrankoski for helpful comments.International Trade and Search 2
trading frictions may e.g. matter very much for the evaluation of ther
impacts of trade policies. Perhaps more signiﬁcantly, the approach
helps to produce implications for how job ﬂows are determined.
Most theories of international trade assume that trading is friction-
less unless trade policies impose costs on traders. Recently models in
new economic geography (Fujita-Krugman-Venables 1999) have taken
seriously the fact that there may be costs associated with international
trade. The costs in these models are international transport costs but
aside from them trading is frictionless. In particular, intranational
trading is frictionless (except in models which study the formation of
cities). Another strand of literature studies the role of labour market
frictions arising from costly search in international trade (Davidson-
Lawrence-Matusz 1999) with the focus on the relationship between
unemployment and international trade.
Recently Rauch (1999) has argued that organized markets do not
exist for diﬀerentiated products. He claims that ”Instead connections
between sellers and buyers are made through a search process that be-
cause of its costliness does not proceed until the best match is achieved.
This search is strongly conditioned by proximity and preexisting ’ties’
and results in trading networks rather than ’markets’.” (Rauch 1999
pp. 7-8). In his empirical work he shows that proximity and common
language or colonial ties are more important in matching international
sellers and buyers for diﬀerentiated products than for homogenous
products. Search barriers are also more important for diﬀerentiated
products. My point here is to study formally the implications of costly
search for international trade in diﬀerentiated goods.
In this paper I shall focus on trading frictions in commodity trade
using standard matching models (Pissarides 1990, Mortensen-Pissarides
1999 Saint-Paul 1997). The set-up has some similarities to the ex-
tension of the Kiyotaki-Wright-model by Matsuyama-Kiyotaki-Matsui
(1993). In my model producers (suppliers) of diﬀerentiated goods andInternational Trade and Search 3
sellers of those goods are searching for each other. The matches be-
tween these agents are determined by a matching function giving the
successful matches. The supplier-seller relationship is assumed to be
permanent unless it is broken by some exogenous event (”death”). To
the best of my knowledge this type of approach has been used before
only by Liski and Virrankoski (1999) who consider the trade in rights
to emit greenhouse gases and assume that traders have to search for
the partner. In their model other markets work frictionlessly.
The underlying model is that of the simplest monopolistic compe-
tition with consumers having Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz (SDS) preferences
originally presented by Krugman (1981). The new twist is the separa-
tion between production and sales activities and the modeling of the
relationship between sellers and producers using the matching models.
The change is made for the following reasons: a) Modern consumer
goods are in many cases very specialised and customised. Thus, it is
hard to image the markets for these goods to be like standard compet-
itive markets but instead involve costly search between sellers and pro-
ducers. b) Due to the post 2nd world war period trade liberalization
trade barriers as such are quite low among the most developed coun-
tries. In Europe it is claimed that the impacts of EU integration are in
reducing trading frictions other than explicit trade policies. Matching
models are one way to analyse these frictions. c) Gains from trade
may be aﬀected by trading frictions. With frictions some producers
are left without sellers. This implies that all varieties are not actually
sold. Trade policies may aﬀect both the number of varieties supplied
and the number of varieties entering shops. For consumer welfare it is
obviously the number of varieties in the shops that count. For a given
degree of slack (suppliers without sellers) an increase in the number of
suppliers beneﬁts consumers but there is an additional potential gain
(or loss for that matter) from how the number of slack ﬁrms changes.
d) Trade policies may interact with the trading frictions. Thus, the
welfare impacts of trade policies may be much stronger than those pre-
dicted by the frictionless trading model. Finally, some trade policiesInternational Trade and Search 4
can be interpreted as being trading frictions in matching models. E.g.
assume a quota on imports is imposed. Assume further that import
license must be renewed each period and that all ﬁrms (old and new)
are treated similarly by the authorities. If all ﬁrms are similar then
not all ﬁrms (including some old ﬁrms) can get the license implying a
termination of old supply relationships.
Since the model production and sales activities are diﬀerentiated
from each other it can be understood to formalise the formation and
functioning of vertical supply chains, i.e. chains of supply from the
producer to the ﬁnal consumer. Recently, the role of supply chains has
been emphasised in the strategic management research (Helfat 1999)
but they have not been analysed in international trade models. Ven-
ables (1996) and Krugman-Venables (1995) have studied how input
linkages between ﬁrms aﬀect the location of economic activities but
in their models there are no supply chains (or all ﬁr m sb e l o n gt ot h e
same supply chain). In my model there exist several supply chains
within the same industry and the number of chains is determined en-
dogenously. In the model sellers and producers will be grouped in
four groups which could be seen as strategic groups (see Peteraf 1999
for the notion) that are competing in the same markets. The divi-
sion of ﬁrms in groups also divides endogenously the economy in a
”closed” (producers and seller coming from the same economy) and in
an ”open” (sellers and producers from diﬀe r e n tc o u n t r i e s )s e c t o r .
The model can also help in understanding job/worker ﬂows which
arise from entry and exit of ﬁrms. As has been known since the re-
search by Haltwanger-Davis-Schuh (1996) the gross job/worker ﬂows
are much bigger than net ﬂows. Quite often theoretical work to ex-
plain this and other related phenomena has utilised matching models
for labour markets. Here I am concerned with long run implications
of changes in structural policies like trade policies. In this context it
is quite natural also to focus on ﬂows due to exit and entry of ﬁrms
(like in Caballero and Hammour (1997, 1998) when diﬀerent types of
ﬁrms must be matched with each other.International Trade and Search 5
2. The Model
The world is divided in two countries, H (Home) and Foreign (F).
Labour is the only factor used in the production of commodities and
in the sales activities. Country i is endowed with Li units of labour,
i = H,F. There is only one industry but all the goods produced and
supplied to the consumers are diﬀerentiated (horisontally) from each

















,0 < σ < 1, (1)
where ni = the number of varieties (k) sold in country i and ci
k =t h e
amount of variety j consumed in i.
The consumer has to buy the good from a retail shop, and con-
sumers in country i can only visit shops located in country i. This is
not a restrictive assumption since I assume that shops can get their
goods from producers of either country. I assume that each shop
can provide only one variety and thus must choose which producer to
contact. Producers can (and do) enter both markets, H or F. They
enter both of the markets with the same (and one) variety. There are
thus four groups of retailers and producers: H retailers buying from
H producers, H retailers buying from F producers and the same for F
retailers.
The traders, retailers and producers, have to ﬁnd each other. Once
they have found a partner they maintain their relationship unless it is
broken by some exogenous event (to be interpreted below). At each
moment of time the retailer searching for a producer has a non-zero
probability of ﬁnding one producer and a producer searching for a re-
tailer has likewise a non-zero probability of ﬁnding this. At the market
level the process of retailer-producer pair formation is governed by aInternational Trade and Search 6



















j = number of country i shops being matched with producers
from country j, Nj = total number of country j producers either in an
existing relationship or searching for a retailer with υi
j = proportion of
them searching. The total number of retailers searching for a partner
is a proportion νi
j of retailers Mi
j serving market i getting good from
country j supplier. Number of matches is increasing in both the num-
ber of retailers and producers looking for a partner. I assume (2) to be
linearly homogenous (see again Pissarides 1990 for an explanation).
At the individual level the process of matching of a retailer to a
producer is a Poisson process with meeting intensity (the ﬂow proba-
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with the value of the existing relationship, Ji



























Here r = rate of interest (= consumers’ subjective rate of time pref-
erence in both H and F), ωi = wage rate in i, µ = labour retailers
have to use while searching (making search costly), pi
j =r e t a i lp r i c eInternational Trade and Search 7
of the good (all varieties sold in a country by producers from a given
country will be similarly priced in equilibrium), wi
j =p r i c ep a i dt o
the producer, and gi
j = volume of goods sold and produced1.T h er e -
lationship between the retailer and the producer can come to an end
due to some exogenous disturbance. This can occur at any point of
time and its intensity is given by bi
j ,i.e.I allow for the possibility that
the intensity diﬀers across relationships. One example of an exoge-
nous event is quantitative restrictions on imports. If import license
h a st ob er e n e w e da te a c hp o i n to ft i m ea n do l dt r a d e r sa r ec o m p e t i n g
with new traders on equal terms for import permits then (assuming
the quota is binding) it is always possible that old relationships are
broken. In this case the intensity of breakdown diﬀe r sa c r o s st r a d e r s :
Retailers trading with producers from the same country do not face
quantitative restrictions while retailers in business with foreign pro-
ducers face it. τi
j measures here trading costs across countríes. For
each unit of goods imported a payment has to be paid. The gross cost
of a unit of good bought for the retailer is then τi
jwi
j,w i t hτi
i =1 ,a n d
τi
j ≥ 1 for i 6= j.
Before describing how markets are equilibrated I ﬁrst present the
equivalents of (4,5) for the producers. Like entrant retailers the entrant
producers (as also the producers whose relationship has been broken)




































I assume that producer of any variety can search for a retailer
in both of the countries. To make the modelling eﬀort as simple as
1For simplicity only, I assume that sales activities do not require any use of
labour as an input.International Trade and Search 8
possible I assume that producers divide their ﬁrms in two indepen-
dent divisions each serving one of the markets H or F. The role of the
headquarter is to keep up the production facility and organize search.
These activities create a cost 2ωjρ which is equally divided between
the divisions. Alternatively, both of the divisions organize search by
themselves leaving the (costless) coordination activities (choice of vari-
ety) to company headquarters. The total value of an entering producer






where the value of a new production unit from country j looking for a
retailer from country i, Ui





















where ρ is the amount of labour producers use while (e.g. for keeping
production facilities in proper condition) and for searching, and Wi
j



































ωj = cost of production with α+γgi
j giving the labour
requirement for any given level of poduction, α = ﬁx e dc o s ti n c u r r e di n
the production of any variety (at each point of time like e.g. control of
the production process) and γgi
j = variable labour requirement. Unlike
in the static monopolistic competition model I can allow α =0 . As will
become clear below the ﬁxed ﬂow costs of search alone are suﬃcient to
nail down the size of a (producing) ﬁrm. The search context thus adds
to the possibilities to interpret the ﬁxed costs. Finally, I assume that
all the producers are capable in principle of producing any variety.
The variety is chose together with the retailer after the relationship is
formed. It is clear that a variety which nobody else produces is chosen
because it gives a monopoly to the supply chain. From now on I setInternational Trade and Search 9







and Wj = W H
j +UF
j or Wj = W F
j +UH
j if it has found match in only
one of the markets.
I assume that there is free entry to retailer and producer activities,
in the spirit of the monopolistic competition model. I assume also that
retailers and producers can freely choose the location of the partner
with whom they want to trade. With free entry new ﬁrms should not




I will concentrate myself on the case where Ui
j = 0, which certainly
guarantees that (10) holds. In fact, as will be clear from calculations
below, it is the only possibility. The freedom of entry with respect to
the location of the partner implies that V i
j = V i
j0, i 6= i0, j 6= j0.I ti s
easy to show that in the steady state these equations are redundant
given (10). Similarly, in equilibrium entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent be-

















































This is like the free entry condition in the standard monopolistic com-
petition model except that temporal proﬁts must positive to cover the
interest costs on costs of searching partner (search costs adjusted for
the expected breakdown of the current relationship and the length ofInternational Trade and Search 10
search). A similar expression is obtained for producers from (8), (9),




























Prices charged from the consumers, price obtained by the produc-
ers and quantities produced are determined in bargaining between the
retailer and producer once they have been matched. This bargaining
is assumed to follow the usual procedures of Nash bargaining, i.e. the
















which (given (10), (11), and the equivalent expressions for producers)




























j = bargaining power of the seller (given exogenously)2.A n a l o -
gously to the standard monopolistic competition model I assume that
each producer-retailer pair regards itself as ”small” in the sense of not
t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h ee ﬀect of its actions on real income (i.e. on ag-
gregate price level). This implies, from (1), that each pair (producing





1−σ as the demand curve it faces
(A = real expenditure on the good). Maximising (15) subject to this








2Kultti (1999) has argued that the only value for β
i
j consistent with striking
deals immediately even though they have an option to wait on other possible
partners is 1/2.International Trade and Search 11
implying that the partners maximise the joint surplus from the re-






























Note that, ceteris paribus, the income of the producer declines if the
tariﬀ on her product is increased.
The remaining building blocks of the model are the key steady
state requirement (exit of ﬁrms must equal the entry of ﬁrms), equi-
librium condition for the labour market and goods market equilib-
rium conditions. In the steady state the number of exiting ﬁrms
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(18) is nothing but the Beveridge curve relating open vacancies (en-
tering retailers) to unemployment (new producers)3.

























The ﬁrst term gives the demand for labour by i producers searching
for i retailers, the second by i producers producing for i retailers, the
third by i retailers searching for i producers, the fourth and ﬁfth by i
producers searching and producing for j retailers and the the sixth by
i retailers searching for j producers.
3Equation (18) implies that the steady state ﬂow conditions hold also in the
labour market (i.e. new employment equals the loss of jobs due to termination of
relationships between retailers and producers).International Trade and Search 12
Finally, the equilibrium conditions for the goods markets have to
be speciﬁed. Assuming that tariﬀ revenues are handed back to con-
sumers in a lump sum fashion the consumer steady state expenditure













































j,t h eﬁrst term gives the labour
income, the next the income from wealth and the third the tariﬀ rev-
enue (assumed to be transferred by the government in a lump sum
fashion)4. From (1) it is straightforward to derive the equilibrium
condition in goods markets. Given the pricing equations (16) it is
natural to concentrate on symmetric equilibrium (which has already
been implicitly assumed above when dropping the variety index k)
where all varieties supplied in i and produced in j are produced (and
consumed) in identical quantities. With this the equilibrium condition





















































The model is now completed after the numeraire is chosen. Let it
be country H labour, i.e. set ωH =1 .
4The consumer faces an intertemporal optimization problem. Since we the
rate of interest is equal to the rate of time preference and the ﬂow income of the
consumer is constant (at the steady state level) the consumer ﬂow expenditure
is equal to the consumer income at any point of time. The income consists of
dividends from the ﬁr m s( w h i c hq u a r a n t e et h a tt h er a t eo fr e t u r nf r o mﬁrms is
equal to r).International Trade and Search 13
3. Trade policies and search
In this paper the main focus is on the symmetric equilibrium, the




i ≡ τ, Ni = Nj ≡ N,f o ri 6= j etc. Also ωF = ωH =1 .T h eﬁrst
result is the ﬂows of new retailers relative to ﬂows of new producers
can be explicitly solved from the model:
Proposition 1 θ ≡ ν
υs =
ρβ





Proof Given ωF = ωH =1 , using (16) g can be solved from (12)
and substituted in (17) and (13). Notice that when (16) is substituted
in (17) the equation does not depend on τ.This gives two equations to
solve for wg (wg)a n dθ (θ). Solving out wg leads to an equation the
solution of which is given in the proposition.¥
The ﬂows of new retailers relative to ﬂows of new producers de-
pends naturally on costs incurred while searching: lower relative search
costs induce higher rate of search. The more powerful retailers are rel-
ative to producers in bargaining the smaller the relative rate of entry
by retailers. The remarkable result is that trade policies aﬀect the
relative rates of entry when agents are located in diﬀerent countries:
an increase in tariﬀs increases the entry of new (domestic) retailers
relative to the entry of new (foreign) producers. An increase in tariﬀ

























< 0 and θ increases with τ.T h e e l a s t i c i t y o f θ with
respect to
µ




withInternational Trade and Search 14
respect to θ is larger than -15. This means that the income of producers
supplying markets abroad is the lower the higher the tariﬀ.S i n c e ,f r o m














the volume of goods produced and sold for markets abroad also declines





pact of changes in the separation probabilities can be directly read
from (23) and (24). I have now established
Proposition 2 Higher tariﬀs reduce the gross income from supply-
ing markets beyond national borders. Also the scale of foreign opera-
tions (volume sold which equals the production volume) is the smaller
the higher the tariﬀ. The incomes of producers and retailers working
within their national economies are not aﬀected by tariﬀs. An increase
in the probability of separation increases the volume of production.
It is noteworthy that tariﬀsh a v ea ne ﬀect on the scale of opera-
tions by (some) ﬁrms. This is in contrast to the standard monopo-
listic competition trade model (e.g. Krugman-Venables 1995). Since
the sales by retailers selling varieties produced outside their national
borders are smaller when tariﬀs are higher their gross incomes are
also smaller. Their proﬁts of both producers and retailers engaged in
international transactions are also the smaller the higher the tariﬀs.
This can be directly seen from (12) and (13). If the changes in the
probability of separation are interpreted as changes in non-tariﬀ bar-






















θ + x2 by Euler-
equation. Thus, −1 < (q(θ))
0
θ
q(θ) < 0.International Trade and Search 15
restrictive policies increases the ﬁrm size contrary to the eﬀects of a
tariﬀ increase. The interpretation is natural: If the probability of sep-
aration increases one has to make enough of the relationship while it
exists. Tariﬀs reduce the proﬁtability of the ongoing relationship but
does not have any eﬀect on its expected durability.
Equation (24) also establishes the claim made above: now α =0
is a permissible choice. The ﬁxed ﬂo wc o s t so fs e a r c ha r ee n o u g ht o
give a determinate size to the volume of production by each ﬁrm (or
producer-retailer pair).
The rate of entry of new producers, υ, can be solved from the

















Proposition 3 The share of entering producers to supply markets
abroad (producers looking for a match) of total number of producers,
υ, is the lower the higher the tariﬀ. It is the higher the higher the
larger is the intensity of separations. The impact of tariﬀso nυ is the







> 0,a n d∂θ
∂τ > 0, υ must be lower
with higher τ. ¥
The varieties produced will in the end be solved just like in the
standard monopolistic competition model from the labour market
equilibrium: the size of the market is crucial for the number of va-
rieties. To get there requires some work, however. Using Propositions
1a n d3g i v e sνs = υ
ρβ
µ(1−β) and νs = υ
τρβ
µ(1−β).N o w , b y d e ﬁnitionInternational Trade and Search 16
M = N (1 − υ)+νM, since the number of retailers already sell-
ing, M (1 − ν), equals the number of producers already producing,
N (1 − υ).T h i sg i v e s











It is straightforward to see on the basis of Proposition 3 that ∂νs
∂τ > 0.
From (27) it can be shown that ∂s
∂τ > 0, i.e. that an increase in tariﬀ
rate increases the total number of retailers in the market relative to
the number of producers. This assertion follows, because the elasticity
of υ with respect to
θq(θ)
b and the elasticity of
θq(θ)
b with respect to τ
are both below unity.
The symmetric steady state labour market equilibrium condition
is from (19), (26), (27)
N [(υ + υ)ρ +( νs + νs)µ +( 1− υ)γg +( 1− υ)γg]=L. (28)
T h i sc a nb es o l v e df o rN. The model is now completely solved (it
is easy to show the existence of the steady state equilibrium). From







ρ[υ + υ]=L. (29)
The following result is immediate (from Proposition 3):
Proposition 4 Total number of producers increases with tariﬀ,a n d
decreases when the producer cost of searching for a partner, ρ,i n -
creases and when the elasticity of substitution between varieties, σ,
increases. The number of producers decreases when the separation in-
tensity, b,i n c r e a s e s .International Trade and Search 17
The mechanism underlying Proposition 4 is novel. Tariﬀsr e d u c e
the scale of production for foreign markets reducing the overall demand
for labour. At the same time it reduces the number of vacant producers
and increases the number of vacant retailers. Both of these eﬀects
tend to increase the demand for labour. The net eﬀect is a reduction
in the demand for labour. Consequently, the number of producers
increases when tariﬀs are increased. An important implication of the
proposition is that tariﬀs induce a shift of resources from the open
sector to the closed sector. While this is not surprising again the
mechanism is worthwhile to spell out. Since tariﬀsd on o ta ﬀect the
scale of operations in the closed sector nor the number of retailers
and vacancy rates but increase the total number of producers labour
must shifted to the home market operations. But this means that less
labour is employed in international operations.
Let us next take up the welfare eﬀects of trade policies. Recall that
the supply of varieties in the closed sector is n ≡ (1 − υ)N and in the






Since higher tariﬀsi n c r e a s eN, the number of varieties supplied
through home retailers, n, increases since their vacancy rate is not
aﬀected by tariﬀs. Similarly the number foreign varieties supplied
through domestic retailers increases since the vacancy rate of foreign
producers at domestic markets declines (and number of matched pro-
ducers increases). The only negative eﬀect on welfare comes from the
amount of each imported variety consumed. To get a concrete exam-
ple of welfare improving tariﬀs is is easy to see from Proposition 1 and
(24) that g = σ
(1−σ)γ
(r+b)ρ
(1−β)θq(θ).A l s o ,υ =
θq(θ)





ρ(υ+υ). By plugging these in the previous expression of welfare it
is easy to see that a suﬃcient condition for a small tariﬀ to improve
welfare is
(1−σ)b
σ > θq (θ). Thus, the smaller the elasticity of substi-
tution between varieties and the larger the trading frictions the moreInternational Trade and Search 18
l i k e l yi ti st h a tas m a l lt a r i ﬀ increases welfare. The following claim
has now been established:
Proposition 5 The welfare impacts of tariﬀsa r ea m b i g u o u s .T a r i ﬀs
can increase welfare. The higher the trading frictions the more likely
it is that a small tariﬀ at least improves welfare.
The last point of the proposition shows that the trading frictions
may be crucial for policy conclusions. Since the tariﬀ analyzed is a
tariﬀ i m p o s e db yb o t ho ft h et r a d i n gc o u n t r i e st h ew e l f a r ei m p a c t
does not at all depend on the standard argument for tariﬀsi nt h e
monopolistic competition framework.
The ﬁnal issue to be studied are the ﬁrm/job ﬂows. In the steady
state there are naturally no net ﬂows. Gross ﬂows are positive, how-
ever. Since the rate of ﬁrm destruction (which is equal to gross cre-
ation) in the closed sector production is bN (1 − υ) and in the closed
sector retailing bM (1 − ν) the gross destruction (gross creation) will
be increased in both activities by tariﬀ increases. The same holds in
the open sector. The interesting point is that the gross ﬁrm ﬂows in
the open sector are higher than in the closed sector as long as the
tariﬀ rate is positive. This is since the tariﬀ reduces the open sector
vacancy rate but does not have any eﬀect on the closed sector vacancy
rates. In the open sector it is also interesting to notice that gross ﬂows
are increased more in retailing than in production. This is the case
since
M = sN,
and s increases with the tariﬀ.
The ﬁrm ﬂows can be directly translated into job ﬂows. In the
closed sector gross job ﬂows move together with gross ﬁrm ﬂows if
tariﬀs are increased since the ﬂows depend on tariﬀs only through
tghe number of ﬁrms. In the open sector things are more surprising.
In fact in the open sector production the gross job ﬂows decrease when
tariﬀs are raised. It is easy to show that the gross job destruction (andInternational Trade and Search 19






¸ which is decreasing in the tariﬀ rate. To
sum up
Proposition 6 At a r i ﬀ increase increases gross ﬁrm ﬂows (gross ﬁrm
creation and destruction) in all sectors. In the tariﬀ protected sec-
tor the gross ﬁrm ﬂows in retailing increase more than in production.
Higher tariﬀ increases also gross job ﬂows (job creation and destruc-
tion) in the closed sector. Higher tariﬀ reduces gross job ﬂows in the
open sector.
The impacts of changes in trading frictions b and b diﬀer in many
ways from the impacts of tariﬀs. This clear since e.g. θ and θ do
not depend on them. One very interesting implication is (from (24))
that production of any variety will increase if trading frictions in the
market for that variety increase. Given the possibility to interpret
trading frictions as arising from quotas there is a fundamental non-
equivalence between the policies: With tariﬀs the open sector ﬁrm
production levels are smaller while with quotas they are higher. Larger
trading frictions also imply, from (25), that the producer vacancy rate
is also higher. It is now clear, using (29), that the number of varieties
unambiguously declines when trading frictions increase. These can be
collected in
Proposition 7 The volume of production of a variety increases when
the trading friction in the market for that variety increases. Trad-
ing frictions reduce the number of varieties produced and their welfare
implications are exactly opposite to the welfare eﬀects of tariﬀs.
The basic asymmetry between tariﬀs and trading frictions extends
also to the gross ﬁrm ﬂows: The reasoning just made shows thatInternational Trade and Search 20
bN (1 − υ) and bN (1 − υ) get smaller whenever any trading frictions
increase. Since now 1 − υ =
θq(θ)
b+θq(θ) and the corresponding expression
holds for the open sector (24) implies that the gross job ﬂow in the
closed sector, bN (1 − υ)γg,d e ﬁnitely declines when trading frictions






crease or decline when b increases. It is straightforward to calculate




≶ r.I f t h e
producer’s probability of ﬁnding a retailer is high enough then gross
job ﬂows in the open sector increase while if the probability is low
enough the reverse holds. To sum up
Proposition 8 Higher trading frictions in any sector reduce the gross
ﬁrm ﬂows in all sectors. An increase in b (b resp.) reduces the gross
job ﬂow in the closed (open) sector but may increase it in the closed
(open) sector.
4. Asymmetric equilibria: Size diﬀerences
The previous section studied only the case of perfectly identical
trading partners. To understand how the model can treat asymmet-
ric countries consider the case of countries diﬀering in labour endow-
ments but otherwise perfectly identical. Assume also that separation
probabilities are the same in domestic and international transactions.
Denote the F country wage rate by ω (recall that H country wage rate
is the numeraire). Using (12), (13), (16), and (17) one can solve for
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It is interesting that the asymmetry does not have any eﬀect on the
home market vacancy rates. In F home market the change in wage rate
has equiproportional eﬀect on the producer price of the commodity
leaving all the real variables unchanged. The wage rate has an eﬀect
on vacancy rates in international transactions. An increase in F wage
rate increases the search costs for foreign producers. This leads to an
increase in the vacancy rate of H retailers in business with F producers.
The opposite happens in the matching process between H producers
and F retailers: higher F wage rate increases the cost of search of F
retailers increasing the relative producer vacancy rate.
Given (30) the scale of operations (sales) by the matched ﬁrms in




σ (r + b)ρ








Since θq (θ) is increasing in θ (30) implies that if the wage cost in
production increases then the sales abroad (of a single variety) decline
while if the wage costs of a retailer increase then the retailer imports
more of the variety, i.e. the scale of imports of any foreign variety
increases. This is like the international competitiveness eﬀect in con-
ventional models but again the mechanism behind the result is novel.
When the wage costs for F producers increase they have to cover higher
anticipated costs of search (though, from (13), the search costs do not
increase in proportion to ω, since the probability of ﬁnding a retailer
also increases). Thus they have to get higher proﬁts from the ongoing






















which implies that the producers cannot pass completely the higher
costs on retailers. But (31) and (32) together imply that wH
F increases
in ﬁxed proportion to ω. Since producers do not have all the power in
negotiations with retailers they have to bear some of the cost increase
they face. In this model the whole adjustment is in the quantityInternational Trade and Search 22
traded. Similarly when F retailers are matched with H producers the






















This increases with ω (since θ
F
H decreases with ω). Since the consumer
price level does not in this case depend on the wage rate and the
retailer has to increase her income (to cover the anticipated losses
from search in case the relationship is broken) she must increase the
sales: (31) and (33) imply that wF
H is not inﬂuenced by the wage rate.
The labour market equilibrium conditions for H and F respectively


























































Final equation needed is the equilibrium for goods markets. Take
the equilibrium in F for varieties produced in F. Using (12), (13), (16),
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The previous three equations can now be solved for the total num-
ber of producers in both countries and for the F wage rate. Consider
ﬁrst the perfectly symmetric equilibrium where both countries have
identical labour endowments. In that equilibrium the wage rates are
equal, ω = 1, as also are the number of producers and retailers and
the vacancy rates in diﬀerent types of matches, θ
i
j = θ ∀ i,j.C o n s i d e r
now what happens if the F labour endowment becomes smaller and H
labour endowment grows to keep the world total labour endowment
unchanged. (34) and (35) imply that at unchanged F wage rate the
number of H producers (varieties produced in H), NH, must increase
and the number of F producers (product varieties originating from F),
NF, must decline keeping the total number of producers, NH + NF
unchanged. Look next at (36). It is easy to see, that the coeﬃcient of
NF is smaller than the coeﬃcient of NH when evaluated at the sym-
metric equilibrium. The proposed change in the labour endowments
increases the left hand side of the equation while the right hand side
remains constant, there is ”excess supply” in the goods market. How
can it be eliminated? From (30) and (18) it is seen that υH
F is a de-
creasing function of ω while υF
H is an increasing function of ω. Divide
both sides of the equation by ω. Then the right hand side does not
depend on the wage rate at all. Since the elasticity of (θq(θ)) with re-
spect to θ is less than unity the left hand side is an increasing function
of the F wage rate unless σ is very small. In fact σ ≥ 1
2 is suﬃcient,
but deﬁnitely not necessary, for it. The new equilibrium can then be
reached only if the F wage rate declines. Hence, the small country
(F in this case) will have a lower wage rate than the large country.
Recalling the above analysis on the determination of production levels
the small country will produce (and export) larger quantities of each
of the variety it produces than the large country. In addition, the
small country produces a smaller number of varieties. This discussion
c a nb es u m m e du pi n
Proposition 9 In a world with two countries with diﬀerent factor
endowments but otherwise identical countries the small country hasInternational Trade and Search 24
a lower wage rate, produces fewer number of varieties than the large
country. The level of production of each of the variety it produces is
larger than in the large country.
Consider next the implications of size diﬀerences to ﬁrm and job














at the same levels as they are in the perfectly symmetric equilibrium)




H. These imply that the gross
ﬁrm ﬂow rates (b(1 − υ)N) in all sectors of the small country (since
NF <N H) are below those in the large country, as is natural. It
is more interesting to compare the sectoral ﬁrm ﬂows relative to the
total ﬁrm ﬂo w si ne a c ho ft h ec o u n t r i e s . F o rt h es m a l lc o u n t r yt h e





F). The previous argumentation gives directly
Proposition 10 The gross ﬂow of ﬁrms in the export sector relative
to total fmanufacturing irm ﬂows in the small country is smaller than
the corresponding gross ﬂow in the export sector of the large country.
The signiﬁcance of this result is in that it shows how asymmetries
between countries may give rise to natural international diﬀerences in
ﬁrm ﬂows. These diﬀerences cannot then be automatically regarded as
evidence of better functioning of markets etc.. The same applies to job
and worker ﬂows. Consider again the gross job ﬂows in export manu-










Use ﬁrst (18) to solve out υH
F and υF
F. Then after inserting the
6I consider only manufacturing ﬂows because most of the empirical research on
the ﬂows focuses (due to data availability and quality) on manufacturing.International Trade and Search 25













. The following proposition is now immediate:
Proposition 11 The gross job ﬂows in the export manufacturing rel-
ative to total manufacturing are larger in the small country than in
the large country.
The gross job ﬂows in the export manufacturing are larger even
though the ﬁrm vacancy rate is also larger. The scale of production in
the small country export production is suﬃciently large to overcome
the eﬀect from the vacancy rate.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that diﬀerences in endowments
also imply diﬀerences in production structure. The share of export









. Thus, the argument preceeding the previous
Proposition implies that
Proposition 12 The share of export production in manufacturing
production is larger in the small country than in the large country.
The proposition just tells that small countries are more open than
large countries even without any policy diﬀerences.
5. Concluding comments
This paper has shown that allowing producers and retailers search
for each other matters for the structure of international trade. It wasInternational Trade and Search 26
shown that the economy is naturally divided in open and closed sectors
through entry of ﬁrms to search processes with partners from diﬀer-
ent countries. Trade policies among other things aﬀect this division.
Trade policies can also potentially have eﬀects not considered in the
traditional literature. Here trade policies have an aﬀect on the scale of
production unlike in the ordinary model of monopolistic competition.
An increase in tariﬀ reduces the production of any internationally
traded variety. The overall number of varieties produced increases
with the tariﬀ. Trade policies also have an eﬀect on the proportion of
ﬁrms matched relative to ﬁrms in the search process. Increased tariﬀs
increase the relative number of retailers in search while the relative
number of producers in search decreases. The model has also impli-
cations for the ﬁrm and job ﬂows. Higher tariﬀs increase the long
run gross ﬁrm creation and destruction. Job ﬂo w s( j o bc r e a t i o na n d
destruction) will increase in the closed sector but decrease in the open
sector when tariﬀs are raised. The asymmetry is due to the fact that
tariﬀs reduce the ﬁrm size.
The welfare eﬀects of tariﬀs are non-standard and surprising. It
is possible that tariﬀs can improve welfare if tariﬀs release resources
enough from producers in the search process relatively more than from
producers actually matched and producing in the sector not protected
by the tariﬀ. This channel for welfare eﬀects of tariﬀs has not been
found in the earlier literature. In particular, it was shown that if trad-
ing frictions are large enough then a small tariﬀ deﬁnitely improves
welfare. I considered only the case of perfectly symmetric countries
which eliminated the usual role for trade policies found in the mo-
nopolistic competition model so this is a new channel for tariﬀst ob e
welfare improving.
I argued that trading friction (the ﬂow probability of a break-down
of the match between a producer and a retailer) can be interpreted
as arising from a quota (auctioned at each point of time) imposed
on imports. With this interpretation the equivalence between tariﬀs
and quotas does not hold. More strict quotas imply that the levelInternational Trade and Search 27
of production of any internationally traded variety increases. Also,
the overall number of varieties produced declines when quota becomes
stricter. All this implies that the welfare eﬀects of quotas are almost
t h eo p p o s i t et ot h o s eo ft a r i ﬀs.
The implications of diﬀerences in labour endowments was also con-
sidered. In the two country world the small country wage rate is
smaller than in the large country. It produces a smaller number of va-
rieties but the output of varieties it sells to the large country is larger
than the large country output of varieties imported by the small coun-
try. The asymmetries show up also in gross ﬁrm and job ﬂows. The
export sector job gross job ﬂow relative to the total manufacturing
sector gross job ﬂow is larger in the small country than in the large
country while the opposite holds for the gross ﬁrm ﬂows.
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